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Abstract:

The 13th Five-Year Plan (2016─2020), with the balanced development of
population being the core element, is crucial for China. The superimposed
effect of an aging population and low birthrate leading to a reduction in
the labor supply would have a fundamental influence on the long term
balanced development of China’s population, implying that China’s
population policy must be adjusted. This paper argues that a gradual
relaxation of the family-planning policy adjustments accords with the
original intention of the population policy design and development
direction. The universal second-child policy is the logical results of the
adjustment and improvement of China’s family-planning policy, and
is designed to bring about positive effects on future demographic and
economic development, particularly in sustaining the long term balanced
development of China’s population, easing the marriage squeeze,
extending the demographic dividend, and delaying the population aging
process. China needs to develop and improve support and governance
systems for fully implementing the universal second-child policy, realizing
the policy transition from rewarding one-child families to population
security and the modern transition of governance systems and capacity to a
universal second-child policy.

Keywords: universal second-child policy, fertility intention, policy effect, policy
transition, governance transition

1. The adjustment basis of the universal second-child policy

L

ong term balanced development is inclusive of balances in multiple
aspects, with population balance itself as the basis and core, which
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depends on rational adjustments of the family
planning policy. In 2015, the family planning
policy of China was further adjusted and improved
during the Fifth Plenary Session of the Eighteenth
CPC Central Committee, by the proposal “Promote
balanced growth of the population, adhere to the
basic state policy of family planning, improve the
population development strategy, fully implement
the policy of allowing couples to have two children
and actively cope with the challenge of an aging
population.” This was a far-sighted major strategic
decision. China’s family planning policy has been
further adjusted to a “universal second-child
policy,” and it is mainly based on the followings
considerations.
First, adjustment and improvement of the
universal second-child policy adheres to the basic
state policy of family planning. The fundamental
reality of China’s large population base has not
radically changed. Population is still one of the
key issues restricting the social and economic
development of China. After more than thirty-years
of practice, development and adjustments, the family
planning policy has been gradually improved. It is in
line with China’s basic conditions, and is the result of
practical application. The results of family planning
should be evaluated in a fair way, and we cannot
deny that it is scientific and correct. Planned birth
control covers a wide range of policies ranging from
the earliest one-child policy and the later family
planning policy, selective second-child policy for
only-child parents (couples who are both from onechild families can have two children), to selective
second-child policy (couples with only one partner
from a one-child family can have two children),
executed in 2014, and now the universal secondchild policy to be launched and executed soon. The
state policy of family planning has been constantly
adjusted and improved through the changes of
national and social conditions.

Second, adjustment and improvement of
the universal second-child policy is a new
manifestation of the two production theories
in the new period, which date back to the early
1980s. The theories reveal the characteristics and
adaptive law of the interrelationships between
material production and human production itself,
explain the dialectical relationship between
population and economy, and form the theoretical
basis of our population policy and family
planning work. During the 1980s, a series of
problems were identified and highlighted; our
enormous population, fertility unrestrained, and
difficulties in production and life. Confronted
with the contradiction of material production and
human fertility, the one-child policy became the
inevitable choice for family planning. In recent
years, the superimposed population structure of
the coexistence of declining fertility and an aging
population leads to a reduced channel of labor,
which would have a profound influence over the
long-term balanced development of the Chinese
population. Thus, mandatory adaptive adjustments
of material production and human fertility should
be made to the population policy. After a prudent
investigation of the long-term cumulative effects of
the family planning policy, a gradual adjustment
has been made from the one-child policy to the
universal second-child policy. It was the rational
choice of historical practice and realistic demands.
Third, the gradually relaxed family planning
policy and the adjustments conform to the original
intention of policy design and development
direction. The universal second-child policy is the
logical result of the adjustment and improvement of
our existing family planning policy. In 1980, after
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
China issued An Open Letter to All Communist Party
Members and Communist Youth League Members
on Control of Population Growth of Our Country
87
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(hereinafter referred to as An Open Letter), the onechild policy was successively implemented in the
urban and rural areas of China (excluded some
ethnic minorities and rural areas near the borders).
In 1982, the CPC Central Committee and the
State Council proposed that some people who did
have difficulty and requested to have two children
could have one more child in a planned way after
approval, and in some provinces the selective
second-child policy (couples who are both onlychild children can have two children) was started
and implemented in the rural areas. In 1984, the
CPC Central Committee put forward that several
more rules be considered and added based on the
rule issued in 1982, and the selective second-child
policy (couples who are both only-child children can
have two children) was adopted and implemented.
In 2013,duringthe Third Plenary Session of the 18th
CPC Central Committee of the Communist Party
of China, the selective second-child policy (a couple
with only one-child partner can have two children)
was put forward in Decision of the CCCPC on Some
Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening
the Reform (hereinafter referred to as The Decision)
and in 2014 the selective second-child policy was
launched and implemented. In 2015, during the
Fifth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China, the
universal second-child policy was put forward.
This was a major measure to promote the longterm balanced development of the population at the
strategic height of China’s long-term development.
The evolution of the family planning policy through
series of adjustments and improvements is in line
with the inherent law of population development of
China, and it is also consistent with the scientific
foresight and political commitment of An Open
Letter: “After 30 years, when the current extremely
tense population situation is alleviated, a different
population policy can be adopted.” A fertility
88

level that is too high or too low is not conductive
to the coordinated development of the population,
economy, society, resources and environment.
A gradual relaxation of family planning policy
benefits the stability of China’s moderate fertility
level and slows alleviates the structural population
problems created by a rapid decline in population
after the population reaches its peak.
Fourth, the universal second-child policy is
currently in line with the mainstream values and
market orientation of society. Population security
and family happiness have become the mainstream
value orientation. The universal second-child policy
has brought about greater room for fertility choice,
and its implementation is conducive to the return of
population policy to human nature and humanity. In
2013, during the Third Plenary Session of the 18th
CPC Central Committee of the Communist Party
of China, it was proposed in The Decision that “The
market plays a decisive role in resource allocation.”
It conforms to “China’s national conditions and
people’s opinions” to make adjustments to fertility
policy through market-oriented measures like
interest-oriented mechanisms in the framework of
fertility control. Jiuquan City of Gansu Province,
Yicheng County of Shanxi Province, Chengde City
of Hebei Province and Enshi City of Hubei Province
were pilot areas for the second-child policy in the
middle of the 1980s, and the measures like late
marriage and late childbirth as well as interval birth
were adopted to control and adjust childbearing
behaviors. In 2000 and 2010, the average total
fertility rates in these four places, Jiuquan, Yicheng,
Chengde and Enshi were 1.31 and 1.52 respectively,
with 0.09 percentage points and 0.34 percentage
points higher than the national levels (1.22 and 1.18
respectively in 2000 and 2011). With the universal
second-child policy, there was only a relative and
limited increase in the total fertility rates in the pilot
areas.
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2. The Effects of the Universal
Second-Child Policy
2.1 Whether the universal second-child policy
will lead to a short-term fertility accumulation
effect
The accumulation of fertility puts forward a
basic theoretical question of demography, namely
due to the wider fertility policy adjustment, how a
group of women of childbearing age give birth to
a second child with an involuntary interval after
the first child (Yao Yinmei, Li Fen, et al. 2014).
There are two fertility patterns after the adjustment
of the second-child policy, namely a slow release
pattern and a burst release pattern. A slow release
pattern refers to women who are relatively young
and therefore extend the interval between their first
and second child. A burst release pattern refers to
women who are relatively older and therefore rush
to give birth to a second child. When childbearing
behavior turns to the burst release pattern from the
normal pattern, it will have a significant impact on
birth population size and fertility levels of a country
or a region in the short term, thus forming a fertility
accumulation effect. The younger the women of
childbearing age who meet the requirements for
the second-child policy, the lower the second-child
fertility release rate in the first few years after the
policy adjustment, and the closer it is to the normal
second-child fertility pattern. In 2014, the selective
second-child policy was launched and implemented
in China (a couple with only one only-child partner
can have two children), which was focused on
comparatively young target population. The National
Health and Family Planning Commission estimated
that, in 2015, 77.8% of the population who met the
requirements of the selective second-child policy
were under the age of 35, with 69.2% born in the
1980s and 8.6% born in the 1990s. Moreover, this
younger population has a lower economic level, so

only 1.76 million couples nationwide had applied
for the birth of a second baby by September 2015,
accounting for merely 15.78% of the target group
for selective second-child policy. As we can see, the
fertility release pattern of the selective second-child
policy is slow, and it is a natural and progressive
fertility process.
The size of the universal second-child policy
target population is bigger than that of the selective
second-child policy target population. It has been
estimated that 60% of the families of 152 million
women of childbearing age ranging from 15 to 49
with only child in 2012 had the desire for a second
child (Zhai Zhenwu, Zhang Ailing et al., 2014). That
is, roughly 69 million families (with target groups
of selective second-child policy) in the target group
of the universal second-child policy were ready to
have a second child, which would probably lead to
fertility accumulation.
Moreover, the target group for the universal
second-child policy is older women of childbearing
age, with 60% above 35 years of age, including 50%
between 40 and 49 (National Health and Family
Planning Commission, 2015). Generally, the older
the women of childbearing age who are in line with
the adjustment of the family planning policy, the
higher the fertility release rate of a second child in
the first few years after the policy adjustment, the
more inclined it is to the burst release pattern. It will
increase the possibility of fertility accumulation
after implementation of the universal second-child
policy. However, there are still a number of other
factors affecting the accumulation effect of the
universal second-child policy. Accumulation release
or accumulation effect refers to the childbearing
behavior of couples of childbearing age who were
not allowed to have second child because of the onechild policy, but can now give birth to a second child
due to the implementation of the universal secondchild policy.
89
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First, multiple factors like childbearing concept
and child-raising costs have caused Chinese families
to become smaller, and children's potential growth
and demand have changed significantly. The birth
motivation reflects diverse needs, and its basic logic
is that fertility is a means to meet certain needs.
Since the rational “second-child” families face
higher direct cost and opportunity cost of fertility
as well as the gradually improved pension system,
healthcare and service system for the elderly, there
is a substitute for fertility demand, so China’s total
fertility rate has maintained a low level for a long
period. After 1990, our total fertility rate has been
lower than the replacement level. It was 1.22 and 1.18
respectively in 2000 and 2010 shown by population
census data. It was 1.04, 1.26 and 1.24 respectively
in 2011, 2012 and 2013 in the sample survey, much
lower than the average world level and fertility
replacement level of 2.5 and 2.1 respectively, and
at an extremely low fertility level (Kohler, Billari,
Ortega, 2002, 2006).① From the experience of
Europe and the United States, a total fertility rate of
1.5 is a highly sensitive warning line. If it is below
1.5, it is possible to fall into the low fertility trap. At
the same time, there is a big gap between fertility
desires and actual fertility rates. The figures of
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) showed that the average
total fertility rate of twenty-four countries is only
63.5% of the ideal number of children. At present,
the average ideal number of children of our country
is 1.6–1.8 (Hou Jiawei, Huang Silin et al., 2014),
which is one of the lowest in the world. The concept
of fewer births has formed with the superimposed
effect of the rapid modernization and long-term
implementation of the “one-child” family planning
policy of our country. In addition, increased costs

and the reverse of intergenerational wealth flow
(wealth flows from the elder generation to the
younger generation) jointly lead to a diminishing
marginal effect, and the number preference of
children has been replaced by a quality preference.
The difficulty of encouraging fertility may even
be greater than that of Taiwan China, South Korea,
Europe and the United States. As a result, the actual
fertility rate will gradually become lower.
Second, the population of women of childbearing
age continues to shrink and becomes aged. Even if
the universal second-child policy is implemented,
this factor will weaken the fertility accumulation
effect. Since 2012, there has been negative growth
of women of childbearing age in the range from 15
to 49 and the women of golden childbearing age in
the range from 20 to 29 (presently, 2/3 of all children
were born by women in this childbearing age range).
The total number of women of childbearing age will
decrease from 383 million in 2011 to 293 million in
2030, while that of women in the golden childbearing
age range will decrease from a peak of 114 million
in 2011 to 65 million in 2032 (under the condition
that the total fertility rate stays the same). According
to further calculations, most of the target groups for
the universal second-child policy are older women of
childbearing age. Around 60% of eligible women for
the universal second-child policy are above the age
of 35, including 50% of women at the age from 40 to
49. Since there is a decline in the number of women
of childbearing age and the older childbearing age,
it will be difficult to witness a sharp increase in the
new born population or a large fluctuation of the
fertility accumulation effect, even in the framework
of the universal second-child policy.
Due to the larger target population of the
universal second-child policy and older women of

① According to research of low fertility rate of Europe by Kohler, Billari and Ortega (2002,2006), with the dividing line of total fertility rate of 1.3, the level
below 1.3 (1.3 included) is regarded as extremely low. TFR below 1.5 is regarded as “quite low fertility rate” in accordance with international standard.
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childbearing age, the release fertility pattern of the
universal second-child policy will, to some extent,
deviate from the normal pattern, and tend toward the
burst release pattern, and the release fertility rate of
two children will be relatively high in the short term.
However, owing to the offsetting effects of factors
like the formation of a new type of fertility concept,
reduction in the number of women of childbearing
age, and aging, the short-term fertility accumulation
effect of the universal second-child policy will be
weakened to a certain extent. The universal secondchild policy will only enhance the fertility rate of
women of childbearing age to a certain degree, and
will not change the basic situation of a long-term
total fertility rate lower than the replacement level of
our country.
2.2 Whether the universal second-child
policy will reduce sex ratios at birth and ease the
pressure on the future marriage market of China
Sex ratio at birth is an important index to analyze
and measure population structure, and the normal
range of sex ratio at birth is 102–107 determined
by the United Nations. Long-term deviation from
the normal range will affect the sex ratio structure
of adult populations, particularly populations of
marriageable age, and further affect the balance of
future marriage. The higher sex ratio at birth in the
recent thirty years of China has caused widespread
concern. In 1980, the sex ratio at birth of China was
as high as 107.11, exceeding the upper limit of the
normal range. It was 108.5, 111.3, 116.86 and 118.06
respectively in 1982, 1990, 2000 and 2010. In 2013
the sex ratio at birth was still up to 117.6 before the
launch and implementation of the selective secondchild policy. In 2010, it was pointed out in the Social
Blue Book of China’s Society launched by the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences that there was a severe
imbalance in the sex ratio of the population under
the age of 19. In 2020, there will be 24 million more
males than females of marriageable age, with 49

million males aged 24 to 28, and only 39 million
females between 22 to 26, and the gap between the
two will reach 10 million (Yao Meixiong, 2015).
The male population of marriageable age will have
difficulty in getting married, which will be a severe
social problem. The long-term deviation in sex ratio
at birth from the normal range will create a great deal
of pressure for the population of marriageable age.
In recent years, scholars in the academic circle
have different or even conflicting views on how
the gradually relaxed family planning policy will
affect sex ratio at birth. The mainstream view is that
a more flexible family planning policy can lead to
a return of sex ratio at birth to the normal range. Li
Jianxin (2009) and Wang Jun (2013) believe that a
moderate relaxation of family planning policy can
ease the intensified condition of sex ratio at birth
caused by strict birth control policy, and can bring
sex ratio at birth to the normal range to a certain
degree. Zhai Zhenwu and Li Long (2014) hold that
a comparatively strict family planning policy leads
to a higher sex ratio at birth to some extent, and
adjustment of family planning policy will bring
about a decline in the ratio. Empirical data have
confirmed this view as well. The year 2014 was the
first year after the implementation of the selective
second-child policy (one-child couple can have two
children)” in China. The national sex ratio at birth
was 115.88, with a decrease of 1.72 than that in
2013, suggesting a significant decline in sex ratio
at birth. As a pilot area of universal second-child
policy, Yicheng City of Shanxi Province had a sex
ratio at birth of 103 for population aged from 0 to
4 in the years of 2000 and 2010, maintaining in
the normal range for a long period. It indicates that
second-child policy has met the fertility desire of the
families, and helped policy goal and fertility desire
reach a comparatively ideal state, and weakened
the fertility culture, namely Chinese preference
for boys, and reduced human intervention in
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childbearing behaviors. With the implementation of
universal second-child policy, sex ratio at birth will
return to the normal range. In the long run, it will
be conductive to easing the pressure on marriage
market, and reducing the adverse effect of male
surplus population on social public security caused
by sex ratio imbalance to a greater extent.
2.3 Whether universal second-child policy
can increase labor supply and extend the harvest
period of demographic dividend
A continuous supply of labor and surplus rural
labor transfers have driven China’s rapid economic
growth in the past few decades. In 2001, China’s
GDP per capita was over 1,000 US dollars, and its
economy broke through the poverty trap (Malthus
Trap). In 2010, China’s GDP per capita reached
4,382 US dollars. China joined the upper middle
income group, and its large population turned into
demographic dividend (China Economic Growth
and Macroeconomic Stability Research Group,
2007). But in 2012, there was a decline in workingage population group from 15 to 59 for the first time,
3.45 million fewer than that of 2011 and labor force
accounted for 69.2%, 0.60 percentage points lower
than that of 2011. It suggests that “an inflection
point” has appeared, and the labor force has started
to decrease after a gradual increase over years. If
the universal second-child policy is implemented,
how much impact will it exert on labor supply of our
country? To what extent can it extend the harvest
period of demographic dividend? We will discuss
the possible impact of the universal second-child
policy on our future labor supply and the harvest of
demographic dividend from the following aspects.
First, the universal second-child policy will
produce growth effect to China’s labor supply.
(1)The fertility desire of universal secondchild policy families. Fertility desire is one of
the core variables that predict the effect of the
universal second-child policy on the actual fertility
92

level. In 2011 the survey on fertility desire of
Beijing conducted by Center for Population and
Development Studies, Renmin University of China,
suggested that if allowed by policy, 62.1% of the
one-child couples, who had given birth to one child
and were aged from 20 to 40, had the desire to have
one more child, with the average ideal number of 1.81
(Jin Yongai, 2014). In 2013, the National Health and
Family Planning Commission conducted a survey
on fertility desire of permanent population who had
given birth to one child and were aged from 20 to 44
in twenty-nine provinces, cities and areas (excluding
Tibet and Xinjiang), and found out that 60.8% of
the one-child couples had the desire to have one
more child with the average ideal number of 1.93.
The analysis of tracking data of studies on “Fertility
Desire and Childbearing Behaviors” of 2010
suggested that there was no significant difference in
the number of children of different policy groups. (Li
Jianxin & Li Na, 2012). Therefore, if the universal
second-child policy is implemented in China, the
fertility desire of the target group should be basically
consistent with that of the policy allowing couples
to have a second child if either parent was an only
child, which is approximately 60% with the average
ideal number of 1.8. Moreover, the fertility rate
of women of childbearing age increased from 3%
twenty years ago to 12.5% in 2010, and therefore, the
proportion of target group of universal second-child
policy who have fertility desire and fertility ability
has become 52.5% after the policy adjustment.
(2) The gap between fertility desire and actual
fertility rate. The total fertility rate was merely 58%
of the ideal number of children in Taiwan China
from 1998 to 2008. The total fertility rate was 51%
to 57% of the ideal number of children in Japan
from 1992 to 2010. The average total fertility rate
of 24 countries of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) was 63.5%
of the ideal number of children. The variation law
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reflected in this data was consistent with that of
fertility desire and childbearing behaviors in the
process of fertility changes (When the fertility rate
is low, the actual fertility level is often lower than
the ideal number of children) proposed by John
Bongaarts (2001). The total fertility rate of Taiwan,
Japan and OECD is comparatively low, so the
actual fertility level in these countries or regions
is far below the ideal number of children. It can be
calculated that the actual fertility rate of women of
childbearing age is roughly equivalent to 60% of
fertility desire (as an alternative variable of the ideal
number of children), based on the change rules and
data of fertility desire and childbearing behaviors.
So it is concluded that about 31.5% of the target
group, who have given birth to one child and have
the desire to have one more in China, will achieve
their fertility goal.
(3)The number of women of childbearing age
who have given birth to one child and have the
desire for a second child and the number of newborn babies under the universal second-child policy.
152 million women of childbearing age, from 15
to 49, who have only one child are ready to have a
second child, and 60% of these families have the
desire to have a second child. About 90 million
women of childbearing age are in compliance with
the universal second-child policy and are ready to
have their second child. There are approximately 69
million women of childbearing age in compliance
with the universal second-child policy, after
a deduction of around 10 million in the target
population in compliance with the selective secondchild policy (both partners are from one-child
family and can have two children) and more than 11
million in the target population in compliance with
the selective second-child policy (only one partner is
from an one-child family and can have two children).

Calculated by the actual fertility rate of 31.5%,
there will be an increase of approximately 21.73
million more births in the future under the universal
second-child policy.” Assume that the target group
of universal second-child policy would gradually
give birth to two babies within six years after the
relaxation of the policy, and the proportion of women
of childbearing age who give birth to one more baby
would be 1.5, 3, 2.5, 1.5, 1.0, and 0.5, should the
universal second-child policy be implemented in
2016, there would be 3.26 million, 6.52 million, 5.43
million, 3.26 million, 2.17 million, and 1.09 million
newly increased population respectively from 2016
to 2021. Starting from 2031, the newly increased
population under the “universal second-child policy”
will gradually enter the labor force. Considering that
60% of the target population of the universal secondchild policy are over 35 years of age, and 50% of
the population aged from 40 to 49 have passed
their golden fertility age, therefore, there would be
a decrease in the actual birth population under the
universal second-child policy.
At present, there is an apparent momentum
toward a low birthrate① in our country. In 2010 the
proportion of the population aged 0─14 was merely
16.6%, far below the world average of 27%. The
implementation of the universal second-child policy
is one of the most important means to adjust the
future population structure and realize a reasonable
supply of labor. In the short to medium term, China’s
labor supply is consistent with the level of the
original policy, but the newly increased population
under the universal second-child policy will have
a positive effect, to a certain extent, from the
consumer perspective on China’s economic growth.
In the long term, the newly increased population
under the universal second-child policy will enter
the labor force in 15 years. This policy will have an

① According to demographic criteria, a society with a proportion of 15% to 18% population aged from 0 to 14 is regarded as “severely low birthrate”.
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influence on China’s labor supply level after 2031,
and will contribute approximately 2.6 percentage
points to our labor force around 2037, bringing
positive effects to the economic growth from both
producer and consumer sides. The National Health
and Family Planning Commission (2015) estimated
that the policy would contribute around 0.5% to the
potential economic growth rate.
Second, the universal second-child policy can
extend demographic dividends to the harvest period.
The demographic dividend in the traditional
sense refers to a lower rate of both child and
elderly dependency, as there will be an increase
in the proportion of the working-age population,
thus forming a comparatively rich golden period
beneficial to economic development before the
elderly population reach a high level. If the total
dependency rate is taken as the judging criterion, it
is the demographic dividend period when the total
dependency rate (subordinate-age population) is less
than 50% (the sum of children under 14 and elderly
people aged 65 and above divided by the workingage population aged 15 to 64).
Figure 1 Trends in the Demographic Dividend Under
Three Different Fertility Policies in China
62

Proportion of dependent age population

60

Fertility poliey remain unchanged

58

Selective two-child policy

56

Universal second-child policy

54
52

Year

50

2050

2048

2046

2044

2042

2040

2038

2036

2034

2032

2030

2028

2026

2024

2022

2020

2018

2016

46

2014

48
44
42
40
38
36
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census data (2010); ② it is assumed that under the
policy “Couples with one partner from an onlychild family can have two children,” women
of childbearing age gradually give birth to two
children within 8 years of policy relaxation, and the
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proportion of women who give birth to one more
baby is 1.3, 1.5, 2, 2, 1.5, 0.7, 0.5 and 0.5 respectively;
③ it is assumed that under the universal secondchild policy, women of childbearing age gradually
give birth to two children within 6 years of policy
relaxation, and the proportion of women who give
birth to one more baby is 1.5, 3, 2.5, 1.5, 1.0, and
0.5 respectively; ④ it is assumed that the females in
the newly increased population under the universal
second-child policy get married at the age of 20
and give birth to two babies without a fertility
interval; ⑤ it is assumed that there is no mortality
in the newly born population. ⑥ only the forecast
data from 2014 to 2050 are listed in the figure with
forecast data before 2014 omitted.

The following conclusions can be drawn from
Figure 1:
First, if the fertility policy remained unchanged,
the total fertility rate would decline from 1.74 in
2000 to 1.45 in 2020, and it would remain between 1.2
and 1.3 in the following years. Under the framework
of this fertility policy, the demographic dividend
would not stop until 2034; the total dependency
coefficient would reach 50.62% and demographic
dividend would end in 2035.
Second, demographic dividend period under
the selective second-child policy (couples with one
partner from an only-child family can have two
children) will be expected to continue until 2034,
which is basically consistent with the end of the
demographic dividend period with the fertility
policy unchanged. Before 2029, the total dependency
ratio is slightly higher under the policy “couples
with one partner from only-child family can have
two children” than that with the unchanged fertility
policy as a result of the released accumulative
fertility energy. After 2029, as the newly increased
population under the policy “couples with one
partner from only-child family can have two
children” gradually become new entrants to the labor
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market, the total dependency coefficient is slightly
lower than that with the unchanged fertility policy.
This shows that the policy “couples with one partner
from one-child family can have two children” does
not have a significant impact on the demographic
dividend.
Third, the demographic dividend of the universal
second-child policy will continue until 2035, and
there will be a one year delay in the closing of the
demographic dividend window of the unchanged
fertility policy and the selective two-child policy.
Before 2031, as the released accumulative fertility
of the universal second-child policy, the total
dependency coefficient under the universal secondchild policy is higher than that of the unchanged
one-child policy and the selective second-child
policy. After 2031, as the newly increased population
under the universal second-child policy gradually
become new entrants into the labor market, the total
dependency coefficient is slightly lower than that
of the unchanged fertility policy, and the selective
second-child policy, and the annual dependency
coefficient under the universal second-child
policy is 1-2 percentage points lower than that of
the unchanged one-child policy and the selective
second-child policy.
2.4 Whether the universal second-child policy
will help to alleviate the problem of the aging
population, and delay the process of an aging
society
The aging of the population as well as its
changes in degree and speed are the most striking
features of population structure changes, and have
raised concerns about the demographic dividend
and its disappearance (Cai Fang, 2009). The most
direct impact of the aging of the population is on the
formulation of social policy and future developments

like pensions, social security and welfare (Hu
Naijun & Yang Yansui, 2012). China entered an
aging society as early as 2000.① In 2010, the elderly
population at the age of 65 and above reached 119
million. At the same time, there were 178 million
elderly population at the age of 60 and above. China
is the only country with more than 100 million
elderly population. In 2014, the elderly population at
the age of 60 and above was 212 million, accounting
for 15.5% of the total population and the elderly
population at the age of 65 and above was 138
million, accounting for 10.1% of the total. According
to the program of the United Nations Population
Forecast (total dependency ratio 1.8), China’s
elderly population at the age of 60 and above will
reach a peak of 439 million in 2050, accounting for
31.1% of the total population, and therefore, China
will enter a severely aging society. Because of the
accelerating elderly population, China is faced with
a more prominent problem of an elderly population.
In 2010, the elderly population at the age of 80 and
above reached 20.63 million, accounting for 11.7%
of the elderly population. In 2050, the senior elderly
population will exceed 100 million in China. The
coexistence of these two factors, namely aging
and declining birthrates, has brought about new
problems, arising in the process of an aging society
with the superimposed effect of labor’s entry to a
reducing channel.
First, the potential support ratio② is continuing
to decline because of a decrease in the working
age population and a sharp increase in the elderly
population. From 1950 to 2010, China’s potential
support ratio decreased from 7.72 to 5.54, and
will fall to 1.55 in 2050. China’s internal structure
of labor will be aging, the size and proportion
of the working age population aged 15 to 24 and

① A proportion of 10% population aged 60 and above or a proportion of 7% population aged 65 are taken as criteria of an aging country or region.
② Potential support ratio refers to ratio of one elderly person aged 60 and above to the number of working age population aged from 15 to 59.
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the population aged 25 to 44 will rapidly decline
before 2035, and the proportion of the working age
population aged 45 to 64 will reach a peak of 46% in
2040 (Yuan Xin, 2012).
Second, the “4-2-1” family structure (4 refers
to four grandparents, 2 refers to two parents and 1
refers to the only child) affects the support of the
elderly population. China Family Development Report
(2015) indicated that empty nest families in the
urban and rural areas accounted for more than 50%
of the total families, the elderly population living
alone accounted for nearly 10% of the total elderly
population, and the elderly people living only with
their spouses accounted for 41.9% of the total elderly
population. In 2009, 18.9% of the elderly population
were disabled or semi-disabled. Our social security
and pension service systems are still being
constructed and improved, a series of problems like
pensions, medical care, and long-term care of the
elderly population are testing the intergenerational
stability of our families.
Third, “getting old before getting rich” and “not
ready to get old” are the basic facts and marked
features of our aging society. At present, the social
policy and social governance in the aspects of
pensions, health care, long-term care and public
resources allocation are in the above state. The
China Family Development Report of 2015 suggested
that 28.9% of the urban elderly population would not
have difficulty in living after retirement, while it was
only 15.9% in the rural areas. A lower proportion
of the elderly population accepted social pension
services and they mainly relied on themselves and
their family members for daily life; the allocation of
health care resources was in a non-equilibrium state
between regions and groups, and there is a great
demand for social services.
If the selective second-child policy implemented
in 2014 remains unchanged, the stock size of the
one-child population of our country will continue
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to increase, and may reach 303.22 million in 2050.
Compared with the policy “Only one child for one
couple,” the only-child population will decrease by
45.27 million (Yao Yinmei, Li Fen et al., 2015). After
the universal second-child policy is implemented, the
target group and newly increased population will be
larger than that of the selective second-child policy,
and the shrinking effect of the only-child population
in the future will be further expanded. It means that
as there are fewer and fewer only-child families,
family risk and social risk derived from the “family
bereft of the only child” and the “family of only one
disabled child” and the “empty nest family” will be
reduced to a certain extent. Such a decrease is also
conductive to building a harmonious family to cope
with future pension problems. The implementation
of the universal second-child policy will make a
certain contribution to delaying the aging process
of our society. It is estimated that the aged in the
population will be around 30.16% in 2050 (the
newly increased population of two generations of
universal second-child policy is included in the total
population), 1 percentage point lower than that of the
program of the United Nations Population Forecast.
The newly increased population under the universal
second-child policy will reduce the proportion of the
elderly to a certain extent, and relieve the pressure
of the future pension system in China. Without
doubt, faced with a 439 million elderly population
at the age above 60 including more than 100 million
senior elderly people in 2050, the universal secondchild policy will only finitely delay the deeply aging
process of our country and will not fundamentally
change this process.

3. The implementation strategies of
the universal second-child policy
With the more relaxed universal secondchild policy, policy support systems and fertility
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governance systems of a new fertility pattern should
be accelerated.
First, relevant laws and regulations and
fertility policy systems should be further adjusted,
to improve policy support systems and fertility
governance systems of a new fertility pattern.
Through revisions and improvements of Population
and Family Planning Law of the People’s Republic
of China, the universal second-child policy is
to be implemented according to the Law. In the
framework of legal thinking and legal methods,
theory innovation, system innovation and value
innovation are required for the population policy of
our country, and the fertility policy system should
transform to adjustments of the structural population
issues. The new and major issues affecting the
structural problems of our country should be timely
included in the fertility policy system, like birth
interval elasticity, regional population differences,
definition of reward supported target groups,
neonatal defect prevention and so on, to shape the
institutional advantages of population policy with
Chinese characteristics. After the start-up and
implementation of the universal second-child policy,
policy support systems should transform from
the original fewer-childbirth reward to population
security. Fertility in compliance with policy will
be encouraged. Care and policy support will be
provided to families giving birth to two children
in compliance with policy. Through hierarchical
governance and multi-attribute governance, an
overall solution should be provided to the effective
connection, coordination and supporting measures
of family inclusive policy, social assistance
mechanisms and benefit guiding mechanisms for
family planning. This is the important direction
of the adjustment and transformation of support
systems and governance systems of family planning
policy in the future.
Second, the continuity of our fertility policy

should be maintained in terms of fertility policy
methods, and the risks derived from the fertility
policy should be avoided. Based on the core value
of “keeping control over population growth,
improving population quality and promoting the
all-round development of people,” reasonable
adjustments should be made to the current fertility
policy, to achieve effective connections between the
adjustments of the fertility policy and to maintain
the seriousness and continuity of our fertility policy.
To advance the modernization of our fertility
governance systems and governance ability, the
relevant departments should implement “the five in
place” to avoid possible social risks. First, adjustment
of detailed rules and regulations should be in place.
After the universal second-child policy is introduced,
rules and regulations for the implementation of
policy should be in place as soon as possible, and
the connection methods of the universal secondchild policy as well as its support systems should
be formulated for the convenience of policy
interpretation and concrete work execution. Second,
policy delivery should be in place. The accurate
connotation of the universal second-child policy
should be understood, namely “a relaxed policy”
does not equal “ease at work.” Ideas and methods of
family planning should be timely adjusted to help the
target group understand that the universal secondchild policy is a long-term adjustment, and to avoid
short-term fertility accumulation effects caused
by “hurried fertility.” Third, technical support
should be in place. Through technology platform
development, the construction of basic information
databases of population should be further improved,
and information sharing of marriage, fertility,
household registration, population f low, etc.
should be achieved. Based on large databases, the
impact assessment mechanism of major social and
economic policies should be established to provide
basic conditions for fertility governance. Fourth,
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implementation and supervision should be in place.
The new connotation of the times should be given
to our family planning policy, and the border and
bottom line of the implementation and supervision
should be clear and definite for the universal secondchild policy, realizing the combination of rigid
law enforcement and soft guidance. Fifth, target
and responsibility should be in place. Party and
government leaders at all levels should personally
take overall responsibility for the universal secondchild policy. The target management responsibility
system should be adhered to and the responsibility
of relevant departments should be implemented.
Third, birth monitoring and early warning
should be strengthened, and governance mechanisms
of childbearing behaviors under the universal
second-child policy should be improved. Through
the research on population development strategy,
the monitoring and early warning for the target
group and newly increased population under the
universal second-child policy should be enhanced
to provide guidance for families’ responsibility and
planned fertility in compliance with policy, and to
maintain good birth order. First, the birth forecast
after the implementation of the policy should be
strengthened. We should get a clear picture of the
basic situation, fertility desire, and expected number
of babies, predict birth population by a variety of
methods, and enhance dynamic tracking. Second,
the birth population of families in compliance with
the universal second-child policy should be managed
by classification. The policy should be implemented
with a priority determined by factors like age of
the childbearing couple, fertility interval, etc. Older
couples should be given priority to their request for
two children, while the younger couples in regions
of higher birth rate and boy preference should be
required to keep a fertility interval, so as to increase
the efficiency of the universal second-child policy.
Third, birth monitoring and early warning should be
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implemented. A management plan for the universal
second-child policy should be ready, to avoid various
potential risks in the process of the implementation
of the policy, and special attention should be paid to
regions of higher birth rate and boy preference, to
prevent rebounded population growth. The target
group of the universal second-child policy should
be guided to appropriately advance or delay their
planned fertility, to prevent structural population
fluctuations, and ensure that policy process, fertility
order and fertility risks are kept under control.
Fourth, target control and effect evaluation should
be implemented. The health and family planning
administrative departments should timely track and
evaluate childbearing behaviors and fertility targets
of the universal second-child policy, strengthen
research of fertility effects and variation tendencies
according to new problems and new phenomena
after the implementation of the universal secondchild policy, and make adjustments to deviations of
the policy system and governance system.
Four th, regional differences should be
taken into full account, and the formulation and
implementation of the universal second-child policy
should be unified and flexible. In the process of
the start-up and implementation of the policy, the
adjustment time of fertility policy and technology
roadmap should be relatively consistent. The key
variables and time nodes of the policy adjustment
should be grasped to provide a clear standard
and route for the implementation of the universal
second-child policy and to maintain social justice
accordingly. Proper classification and differentiated
advancement should be applied in different
regions of different preferences. Regions of higher
birthrate and boy preference are still the focus of
monitoring in our fertility governance. Any illegal
childbearing behaviors should be investigated and
treated in accordance with laws and regulations by
a comprehensive set of legal, administrative and
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economic methods; for regions of lower birthrate
and normal sex ratios at birth, fertility should be
encouraged for those families in compliance with the
universal second-child policy and guidance should
be provided for reasonable selection of fertility time,
with sound childrearing services.
Fifth, demand and supply forecasts of basic public
services should be strengthened, and prospective
allocations of basic public service resources should
be done. In the short term, the universal second-child
policy will place some pressure on medical service
guarantees like delivery assistance, perinatal services
and infant health care. In the medium and long
term, it will put a certain pressure on public service
resources like nurseries, kindergartens, and primary
and secondary schools. The support for public
services should be planned and provided under the
policy, the allocation of public service resources
should be further optimized, and public services like
childbearing health, maternal and child health care,
nurseries and kindergartens should be strengthened.
More hospitals should be established and the
potential of existing hospitals should be further
explored. The medical resources of the Obstetrics
and Gynecology Departments at general hospitals
should be increased including emergency centers for
critical pregnant and parturient women. Planning
and support for educational resources like nurseries,
kindergartens, primary and secondary schools

should be accelerated. Experiments on small-class
education should be made at primary and secondary
schools with a shortage of students, educational
resources should be reserved for the peak of new
students. New nurseries, kindergartens and schools
for compulsory education should be considered and
built in the new urban areas or floating population
gathering areas.
The universal second-child policy is one of
the public polices with far-reaching inf luence
on China’s social and economic transformation,
and this new fertility pattern will bring greater
selection space for families, but planning and
guidance must be considered by the main parties
regarding how to guide the childbearing behaviors
of the target groups to achieve policy efficiency.
At present, in the framework of legal thinking and
legal methods of China, this will provide a policy
framework and system foundation for the start-up
and implementation of the fertility pattern of the
universal second-child policy, and achieve policy
transformation and population security as well as
governance transformation from the one-child policy
to the universal second-child policy, to construct the
new governance system of the new fertility pattern
and advance the modernization of governance
capacity. It will be conductive to the adjustments of
our structural population problem, and the ultimate
long-term balanced development of our population.
(Translator: Huang Yan; Editor: Jia Fengrong)

This paper has been translated and reprinted with the permission of Population Research, No.6, 2015.
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